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REQUIREMENT OF ARREST IN IMPLIED CONSENT LAWS
By using the public highways, under an Implied Consent Law,'
a motorist impliedly consents in advance to take chemical tests2 if
arrested for driving while intoxicated, and forfeits his driving privi-
lege if he refuses to take the prescribed test. Focusing its attention
upon the arrest requirement, 3 the Supreme Court of North Dakota
recently handed down a unique decision which could, to a large ex-
tent, nullify the Implied Consent Law in that jurisdiction.
In the case of Colling v. Hielle,4 according to the State's evidence,
a police officer saw Colling speeding, weaving, and twice almost hit-
ting a bridge. The officer stopped Colling and asked him to get out
of his car and walk back to the patrol car. He was staggering, and
there was a strong smell of alcohol about him. The officer then arrest-
ed Colling for driving while under the influence of alcohol, and
took him to the police station, where he was asked to take a sobriety
test. Colling refused to submit to the test.
Pursuant to North Dakota's Implied Consent Statute5 the State
Highway Commissioner revoked Colling's motor vehicle operator's
license for this refusal to submit to the test. Subsequently, Colling
was acquitted of the criminal charge of drunk driving. Colling then
sought to have his license reinstated. The State Highway Commission-
er denied the request. The district court reversed the Commissioner's
'E.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-727.03 (196o); N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194
(196o); N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-01 (Supp. 1963); Va. Code Ann. § 18.1-55 (Supp.
1962).
'ests determine the percentage of alcohol in the blood, by weight, through
a direct analysis of the blood, or by analyzing urine, saliva or breath and cor-
relating it to concentration in the blood. Rabinowitch, Medicolegal Aspects of Chem-
ical Tests of Alcohol Intoxication, 39 J. Crim. L., C 9. P.S. 225 (1948). The generally
accepted results are: 0.0o% to o.o5%, definitely not under the influence;
0.05% to 0.15% questionable zone; o.15% or higher, definitely under the influence.
Some statutes provide that introduction of test results establishes a prima facie case.
Some courts hold that test results establish practically conclusive presumptions. See
Heise, Chemical Tests for Intoxication-Scientific Background and Public Accept-
ance, 41 Marq. L. Rev. 296 (1957-58); 29 Conn. B.J. 147 (1955); note, 37 N.D.L.
Rev. 212 (1961); 18 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 370 (1961).
3As pertinent here, the Implied Consent Law provides: "The test or tests shall
be administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer only after placing
such person ... under arrest and informing him that he is or will be charged with
the offense of driving. .. a vehicle. .. while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor." N.D. Cent. Code § 39-2-0o (Supp. 1963).
4125 N.W.2d 453 (N.D. 1963).
GN.D. Cent. Code § 39-2o-o4 (Supp. 1963).
CASE COMMENTS
order and restored Colling's license, which action was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of North Dakota.
The court based its decision on a finding that Colling was not
under lawful arrest when asked to take the sobriety test, as required
by the Implied Consent Law. 6 The crime charged was a misdemeanor,
for which under North Dakota law, a lawful arrest could be made only
when the crime was committed in the presence of the arresting officer.
7
According to the court, acquittal of the accused was a determination
that the crime charged had not been committed, either in the presence
of the officer or otherwise. Therefore, the arrest was not lawful and
the sanctions of the Implied Consent Law could not be invoked.
The correctness of the court's holding depends upon the validity of
its premise that an arrest is not lawful if the accused is acquitted of
the charge for which he is arrested. It seems there is only scant author-
ity to support this premise in its application to the Coiling case. A few
courts have held that an officer making an arrest for a misdemeanor
without a warrant must determine at his peril whether an offense
has been committed. But, these holdings involve circumstances dis-
tinguishable from the Colling case, such as where the officer's conduct
was improper,$ where the arrest was based on outside information
(rather than the officer's knowledge),9 or where authority to arrest
OSupra, note 3. As shown in the above excerpt, the statute requires an arrest.
That the arrest must be lawful is an obvious presumption, but the statute re-
quires nothing extraordinary to make it lawful.7In North Dakota an officer derives authority to make an arrest without a
warrant for a misdemeanor from § 29-06-15, N.D. Cent. Code which provides:
"A peace officer, without a warrant, may arrest a person:
i. For a public offense, committed or attempted in his presence; ...
5. For such public offenses. not classified as felonies and not committed in his
presence as provided for under section 29-o6-15.1"
(§ 29.o6-15.1 referred to in paragraph 5 pertains to the arrest of a non-resi-
dent driver involved in a traffic accident. The principal case involved neither an ac-
cident nor a non-resident driver.)
1Edgin v. Talley, 169 Ark. 662, 276 S.W.69 i (1925). (officer standing on sidewalk,
suspecting minor offense shot through car, injuring passenger, when driver failed
to heed shouted instruction to stop); Adair v. Williams, 24 Ariz. 422, 210 Pac.
853 (1922) (after forcibly entering house on mere suspicion, officer arrested occu-
pants for misdemeanors thereafter committed in his presence).
DWhen an accused was arrested for driving without a license because the
officer had been informed that accused's license had been suspended, the court
said:
"[W]here an officer makes an arrest without a warrant for an alleged crime
which has not been committed in his presence, such arrest is illegal if the crime
has not actually been committed, and if the arrest is followed by imprisonment,
the officer is liable for false imprisonment, notwithstanding he had reasonable and
probable cause for believing that a crime has been committed by the person
arrested...." McKendree v. Christy, 29 Ill. App. 2d 195, 172 N.E.2d 380, 381 (1961).
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without a warrant was restricted by statute to misdemeanors constitut-
ing breaches of the peace.'o
As pointed out in the leading case of Coverstone v. Davies," the
fact that an accused was exonerated in the criminal proceedings has
no bearing upon the legality of the arrest.' 2 An acquittal is merely
an adjudication that the proof was not sufficient to overcome all
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. 13 The critical question
is whether the acts done in the presence of the arresting officer justi-
fied him in making the arrest without a warrant.14 Courts have stated
the various ways in which an officer can justify such an arrest, usually
including expressions such as reasonable or probable cause. As far back
as 1922, in Garske v. United States,'5 it was said:
"It is the well established doctrine now throughout the United
States that for a crime, which they have reasonable cause to be-
lieve is being committed in their presence, though it be a
misdemeanor, duly authorized officers may make arrest without
a warrant."' 16
The minimum grounds for reasonable cause would be such that on
those circumstances alone, the officer would be justified in making a
complaint upon which a warrant might be issued. 17 Some consider
an officer to have reasonable grounds when "his senses afford him
knowledge,"'s or when "facts and circumstances occurring within
his observation, in connection with... common knowledge, give him
probable cause to believe"' 9 a crime is being committed in his pres-
ence. However, reasonable cause is most often said to justify an arrest
simply when "circumstances exist that would cause a reasonable
person to believe that a crime has been committed in his presence.
'20
"°For a good discussion of this distinction, see State v. Mobley, 240 N.C. 476,
83 S.E.2d oo (1954), where the court points out that broadening the power to arrest
for a misdemeanor without a warrant should be accomplished by the legislature.
n38 Cal. 2d 315, 239 P.2d 876 (1952).
3-239 P.2d at 878.
13Helvering v. Mitchell, 3o3 U.S. 391, 397 (1938); Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291,
302 (1914).
24239 P.2d at 878.




State ex rel. Neville v. Mullen, 63 Mont. 50, 207 Pac. 634, 636 (1922).
"4 Am. Jur. Arrest § 29 (1936).
"Cave v. Cooley, 48 N.M. 478, 152 P.-d 886, 888 (1944).
31Ryan v. Conover, 59 Ohio App. 361, i8 N.E.2d 277, 279 (1938). This rule,
stated in various forms, was followed in these cases: Peru v. United States, 4 F.2d
881, 883 (8th Cir. 1925); United States v. Stafford, 296 Fed. 702, 704-05 (5 th Cir.
1923); United States v. Wiggins, 22 F.2d 1oo1, lO02 (D. Min. 1927); Coverstone v.
CASE COMMENTS
The Supreme Court of the United States has called the probable
cause rule the best compromise that has been found for accommodat-
ing the interests of the state and its citizens. On one hand, it protects
citizens from unreasonable or arbitrary conduct on the part of law
enforcement officers. On the other, it gives fair leeway to the state in
enforcing the law for the community's protection.2 1
In light of the strong support for holding an arrest without a
warrant to be lawful when an officer reasonably believes a misdemeanor
is being committed in his presence, it is submitted that the Coling
case was wrong in holding the arrest was rendered unlawful by de-
fendant's subsequent acquittal.
Although not expressed in the Colling case, no doubt one reason
for the holding is that the court felt a revocation following acquittal
would be harsh.2 2 In this connection it must be noted that the revoca-
tion under the Implied Consent Law is for refusing to submit to a
sobriety test, not for drunk driving.23
The Colling decision was based almost entirely upon North
Dakota's statutes, but the same reasoning could have been applied
in any state with similar statutes, such as in New York.24 New York,
however, has dealt with this problem and reached the opposite result.
Davies, 38 Cal 2d 315, 239 P.2d 876, 879 (1952); State v. Reynolds, 1oi Conn. 224,
125 AtI. 636, 637 (1924); Hill v. Day, 168 Kan. 6o4, 215 P.2d 219, 224 (1950); Com-
monwealth v. Chaplin, 307 Ky. 630, 211 SAV.2d 841, 845 (1948); Giannini v. Garland,
296 Ky. 361, 177 S.W.2d 133, 135 (1944); Cave v. Cooley, 48 N.M. 478, 152 P.2d
886, 889 (1944); Bock v. City of Cincinnati, 43 Ohio App. 257, 183 N.E. 119, 121
(1931); Noce v. Ritchie, 1o9 WA. Va. 391, 155 S.E. 127, 128 (193o); State ex rel. Verdis
v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 120 W. Va. 593, 199 S.E. 884, 887 (1938).
-Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 16o, 176 (1949)-
22In upholding a revocation under the Implied Consent Law, a New York
case conceded that it appeared a bit harsh, but pointed out that petitioner's ac-
quittal did not preclude revocation. Anderson v. MacDuff, 208 Misc. 271, 143
N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
2Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415, 11o N.V.2d 75 (1961);
People v. Wagonseller, 25 Misc. 2d 217, 2o5 N.Y.S.2d 933 (Sup. Ct. 196o); Combes
v. Kelly, 2 Misc. 2d 491, 152 N.Y.S.2d 934 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Anderson v. MacDuff,
208 Misc. 271, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
21In both New York and North Dakota Implied Consent Laws were initially
proposed which did not make arrest a prerequisite. Both were amended-North
Dakota's before enactment, and New York's after the initial enactment-to in-
clude a requirement that the accused be placed under arrest before a test could
be demanded. See N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § ii%-i; N.D. Cent. Code §
39-20-01 (Supp. 1963).
Also, statutes in both states authorize an officer to arrest without a warrant only
when a misdemeanor is "committed or attempted in his presence." See N.Y. Code
Crim. Proc. § 177; N.D. Cent. Code § 29-o6-15 (1960).
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In Anderson v. MacDuff,25 a New York trial court sustained a com-
missioner's revocation of the petitioner's license for failure to take
a blood test after petitioner had been acquitted of drunk driving
charges. The court pointed out that the operation of vehicles upon
public highways is a privilege, not a right, and that when conditions
prescribed by the legislature are not met, the privilege may be denied
to prevent unsafe driving on the highways.26 Consent to take a sobriety
test under the Implied Consent Law is such a condition.
Also, a Nebraska case, Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles,
27
upheld a revocation after acquittal. The court felt acquittal of a
criminal charge of drunk driving had no bearing upon the separate
statutory proceedings under the Implied Consent Law. This holding
is analogous to the United States Supreme Court decisions holding
that acquittal on a criminal charge does not bar a remedial civil
action by the Government.
28
A decision such as Colling is not only unnecessary; it is positively
harmful. In addition to confusing the law of arrest in that jurisdiction,
and perhaps making officers liable whenever a defendant is acquitted,29
it has the further effect of virtually invalidating the Implied Consent
Law.
The most obvious purpose of Implied Consent Laws is to coerce
drivers into submitting to chemical tests. To hold that acquittal pre-
cludes revocation removes any incentive to take the test. When a
driver refuses the test and is subsequently convicted, his license will
be revoked for the refusal, but it would usually be suspended any-
way for the conviction of drunk driving.30 On the other hand, if he
refuses the test and is acquitted of drunk driving charges, he goes
free of any penalty. Moreover, in many jurisdictions, refusal to take
sobriety tests cannot be commented upon in the trial for drunk
52 o8 Misc. 271, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
2Id. at 258-59; accord, Prucha v. Deparment of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415,
11o N.W.2d 75 (1961); Combes v. Kelly, 2 Misc. 2d 491, 152 N.Y.S.2d 934 (Sup.
Ct. 1956).
-172 Neb. 415, 11o N.W.2d 75 (ig6i).
nHelvering v. Mitchell, 3o3 U.S. 391, 397 (1938); Murphy v. United States, 272
U.S. 630, 631-32 (1926); Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178, 188-89 (1897).
2"[1T]he court has... also invited all motorists to sue honest, conscientious
law enforcement officials for false arrest, where the officials have made a reasonable
mistake in the course of doing their duty." Dissent, Coiling v. Hjelle, 125 N.V.2d
at 467.
°E.g., Va. Code Ann. § 18.1-59 (Repl. Vol. ig6o), which provides that a convic-
tion of drunk driving will, of itself, operate to deprive the convicted person of the
right to drive for a period of one year from the date of such judgment.
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driving.3 ' In such jurisdictions, the accused would be further en-
couraged to refuse a sobriety test.
Holding that an arrest without a warrant is made unlawful by
acquittal renders an Implied Consent Law ineffective as an alternative
method of invoking legal sanctions for driving while drinking. The
Implied Consent Law could be invoked independent of the outcome
of the criminal prosecution only where the arresting officer first ob-
tained a warrant, thereby making the arrest "lawful." The disad-
vantages of requiring a warrant to arrest a driver for drunk driving
are fairly obvious. While the officer is engaged in obtaining a warrant
and relocating the driver to serve it, the alcoholic content of the driv-
er's blood would be decreasing.32 Or, conversely, the driver would be
free to claim that he was not intoxicated while he was driving, but
that his blood-alcohol level increased due to alcohol consumed be-
tween the time he was first apprehended and the time the warrant
was served.
It appears that there are three ways in which states with Im-
plied Consent Laws could resolve the question of the relation of ac-
quittal to the arrest requirement.
First, they could remove the requirement of arrest from Implied
Consent Laws. However, a New York trial court held that this would
violate due process, stating that, "conferring upon police officers the
right to make a request under the guise of authority concerning one's
person without specific process and without lawful arrest clearly
amounts to an unlawful infringement upon one's liberty."3 3 Conse-
quently, this approach appears dubious.
Second, they could draft new Implied Consent Laws to include a
provision expanding the authority of a peace officer to make a law-
ful arrest without a warrant when he has reasonable cause to believe
'INorth Dakota's statute, N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-08 (i96o), provides that
comment upon refusal is not admissible in evidence if accused does not testify.
Accord Va. Code Ann. § 18.1- 5 5 .1(i) (1964 Supp.). Also, see e.g., State v. Munroe,
22 Conn. Supp. 321, I7 A.2d 419 (Cir. Ct. 1961); Stuart v. District of Columbia,
157 A.2d 294 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 196o); State v. Ingram, 67 N.J. Super. 21,
169 A.2d 86o (Passaic County Ct. 1961); State v. Paschal, 253 N.C. 795, 117 S.E.-2d
749 (1961); Commonwealth v. Kravitz, 400 Pa. 198, 161 A.2d 861 (1960); Saunders
v. State, 172 Tex. Crim. 17, 353 S.W.2d 419 (1961); State v. Hedding, 122 Vt. 379,
172 A.2d 599 (196*).
3The alcohol oxidizes and the blood-alcohol level decreases about .02% per
hour. Ladd & Gibson, Legal-Medical Aspects of Blood Tests to Determine In-
toxication, 29 Va. L. Rev. 749, 754 (1943)-
C127 N.Y.S.2d at 127.
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